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FOREWORD 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) conducts 
studies relating to problems in a number of areas of wide concern: energy, 
food and agriculture, human settlements and services, resources and the environ-
ment, and management and technology, as well as the analytic techniques 
required to address these problems. 
To support these activities the Institute also addresses questions relating 
to the scientific philosophy that should underlie this work, to the crafts involved 
in addressing real problems, and to how the quality and relevance of such work 
should be judged. 
This paper by Giandomenico Majone, who has been associated with the 
Institute from its early days, addresses some important philosophical questions 
relating to systems analysis. 
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Head 
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(Received April 1979: in revised form Sepe ember 1979) 
The received view of the scientific method, as represented for instance by logical positivism, has only 
historical interest for the specialists, but it is still widely, if implicitly, held by decision and policy 
analysts. On the other hand, recent developments in philosophy and the history of science, which 
stress the fallibility of theories and the social and historical character of scientific knowledge and 
criteria, have not yet been assimilated by analysts. This paper argues that these recent methodologi-
cal developments offer important insights into many theoretical and professional problems facing 
students of policy-making. Thus. an appreciation of the craft aspects of scientific inquiry not only 
clarifies the subtle relationship between theory and practice in any type of systematic analysis, but 
also suggests a conceptual model of the analyst's task that is quite different from the conventional 
decision-making paradigm. Again, Popperian and post-Popperian views of the evolution of knowl-
edge are shown lo be relevant to the evaluation of policies and to the study of their development. 
Particularly important in this respect is the notion, due to Lakatos, of problem shifts in competing 
research programmes. Even the role of advocacy in policy arguments appears in a new light after we 
realize the importance of persuasion and propaganda in the history of scientific development. There 
are reasonably well-defined situations in which the use of persuasion, far from violating the analyst's 
code of professional behavior, is not only unavoidable but also rationally justifiable. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
IF SCIENTIFIC knowledge is in fact, in Pop-
per's phrase, "common sense knowledge writ 
large," what can we learn, as systems or policy 
analysts, from recent developments in the phi-
losophy and history of science? Methodologi-
cal debates cast long shadows over the most 
pragmatic domains, though the images are 
often fuzzy, and sometimes reflect patterns of 
thinking that are already obsolete. 
The received view on scientific method, 
which in one form or another has dominated 
the philosophy of science from the 1920s to the 
1950s, has by now only historical interest for 
the specialists; but it is still accepted by many 
researchers as a general scientific ideology. In 
particular, the influence of logical positiv-
ism-a key component of the received 
view-has been felt throughout the social and 
behavioral sciences, and nowhere more 
strongly than in the study of decision-making. 
Appeals to the scientific method (rather 
glibly equated with problem-solving-through-
mathematical-modeling) preface textbooks on 
operational research and systems analysis, and 
figure prominently in the programmatic state-
ments of the professional societies. For many 
of its advocates, systems analysis is nothing 
more than the scientific method extended to 
problems outside the realm of pure science. 
Cost-benefit analysts stress the scientific vir-
tues of their methods: quantification, formali-
zation, explicitness, objectivity. Evaluation 
researchers are supposedly engaged in the 
scientific assessment of public programs. Even 
the rational-deductive ideal for ranking policy 
alternatives according to a strictly defined hier-
archical system of values is said to represent 
an ideal of science transferred to the field of 
values. 
In reality, these references to science and the 
scientific method are not so much methodo-
logical commitments as they are ideological 
props. They do not direct attention to any deep 
affinities, but are attempts to increase the col-
lective confidence of a group of new disciplines 
striving for academic and social recognition. It 
could not be otherwise, for the conception of 
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science implicit in such proclamations of 
method lacks historical reality and epistemolo-
gical substance. Few scientists and philoso-
phers of science still believe that scientific 
knowledge is, or can be, proven knowledge. 
Many would, in fact , agree with Toulmin that 
"if we wish to understand how actual sciences 
operate .. . we must abandon the assumption 
that the intellectual contents of natural sciences 
actively in debate have 'logical' or 'systematic' 
structures: we must instead consider how such 
sciences can succeed in fulfilling their actual 
explanatory missions, despite the fact that, at 
any chosen moment in time, their intellectual 
contents are marked by logical gaps, incoher-
ences, and contradictions" [I 7, p. 605] . 
To repeat the initial question : what can stu-
dents of policy-making learn, not from the 
idealized textbook image of science that in the 
past has been foisted on them, but from the 
'unsystematic', 'illogical', and all too human ac-
tivity which is the daily experience of the work-
ing scientist? This is a very broad question, and 
no more than a partial and tentative answer 
will be given in this paper. The selection of 
themes necessarily reflects my personal inter-
ests, and specific results in the philosophy or 
history of science are presented in capsule 
form. I hope not to have misrepresented the 
views of the scholars whose works I have used. 
At any rate, the reader is urged to check the 
correctness of my interpretations through the 
references given in the text. 
In section 2, I consider the craft aspects of 
scientific inquiry and argue that this perspec-
tive, derived mainly from the works of Polanyi, 
Kuhn and Ravetz, throws new light on some 
important, but generally overlooked, character-
istics of policies and of policy analysis. 
Section 3 is concerned with the implications 
for policy evaluation of Popperian and post-
Popperian views on scientific knowledge and 
its evolution. Of particular importance, here 
and in the next section, is Lakatos' notion of 
'research programmes'. 
Section 4 makes use of Popper's 'World 3' to 
introduce the idea of an autonomous policy 
space (an idea which can be found , in more or 
less explicit form, in the writings of a number 
of students of policy). Strictly related to the 
notion of an autonomous policy space is that 
of problem-shifts (Lakatos). I argue that ex-
planations of policy development ih terms of 
policy-space constructs are more satisfying, 
and potentially more powerful, than other 
types of explanations. 
Finally, in section 5, I discuss the role of 
persuasion and propaganda in science (taking 
my clue from Feyerabend's discussion of Gali-
leo's advocacy of Copernicanism). Policy advo-
cacy and 'rationalizations'-far from being, 
under all circumstances, capital sins against the 
analyst's professional integrity and intellectual 
honesty- are not only unavoidable but also 
rationally justifiable. 
2. THE ART OF INQUIRY 
Fallibilism and its consequences 
Logic shows the inconclusiveness of the 
basic patterns of argument used in science; his-
tory testifies to the possibility of genuine scien-
tific knowledge. This apparent paradox cannot 
be resolved within the traditional epistemologi-
cal concerns of the older philosophy of science. 
Since individual endeavors are fallible, the 
emergence of a (provisionally) accepted body of 
knowledge must be explained in terms of socia l 
mechanisms. "Nature," writes Ravetz, "is not 
so obliging as ever to give marks of True or 
False for scientific work, and so a scientific 
community sets its standards for itself" [15, 
p. 82]. 
Some form of conventionalism is the ines-
capable logical consequence of fallibilism. If 
there is no demonstrative certainty for the con-
clusions of science, their ' truth' or, at any rate, 
their acceptability as scientific results, must be 
established by convention : through a con-
sensus of experts in the field, and the fulfilment 
of certain methodological and professional 
canons- the rules of the scientific game. 
The problem of testing the correctness of a 
policy or decision is analogous to that of 
determining the truth of a scientific theory. 
According to the received view of policy analy-
sis-in which policy-making is equated to deci-
sion-making, and the latter is formalized as a 
means-end relationship- a decision is correct 
"if it can be shown to attain some specific 
objective, where the objective can be specified 
without describing the decision itself" [12, 
p. 49]. Such a proof requires that three condi-
tions be simultaneously satisfied : (a) it must be 
possible to detect the specific effects of the 
decision against a noisy background of con-
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comitant decisions, measurement errors, and 
random fluctuations of the system; (b) a well-
tested theory connecting means and ends is 
available; and (c) there is agreement on goals. 
If even one of these conditions is violated, no 
objective test of correctness is possible. It has 
been argued that in such a case agreement on 
policy is the only practicable test of 'good' 
policy: policy-makers may agree on policy 
itself, even if they do not agree on goals or 
theory. But even more important than such di-
rect agreement on policy as a test of correct-
ness, is agreement on procedures, on the rules 
of the policy game. In the law, in public admin-
istration and, to an increasing extent, also in 
business administration, decisions are accepted 
not because they can be shown to produce 
desired outcomes, but because of a generalized 
agreement on decision-making procedures. 
Reliance on detailed procedures, whether in en-
vironmental regulations, in the licensing of 
nuclear power plants, or in industrial quality 
control, greatly increases the costs of decision-
making, but it is also an unavoidable conse-
quence of the cognitive and social complexity 
of today's problems. As long as the correctness 
or fairness of the outcome can be determined 
unambiguously, the manner in which the deci-
sion is taken is largely immaterial: only results 
count. But when the factual or value premises 
are moot, when no objective criterion of truth 
exists, procedural aspects acquire special sig-
nificance. 
Belief in the possibility of discovering correct 
solutions for a wide variety of problems has 
probably served a useful ideological function in 
the early stages of development of systems and 
policy analysis. Today, the traditional preoc-
cupation with analytic methods stressing out-
come rather than process must give way to a 
broader approach, in which procedural design 
(alternative methods of structuring the decision 
process) assumes primary importance. Natur-
ally, the criteria for choosing among decision-
making procedures are not the same as those 
used in choosing among alternatives for a par-
ticular decision. While in the latter case effec-
tiveness and efficiency are the dominant cri-
teria of choice, the metacriterion for evaluating 
procedures is legitimacy-the capacity of a 
procedure to elicit generalized acceptance for 
the decisions it produces, regardless· of their 
substantive consequences. One hopes, of 
course, that good procedures will increase the 
probability of good decisions, but, as Popper 
has often remarked, it is impossible to justify 
the rules of a game (including the rules of tht" 
scientific game) only in terms of success. 
Science as craft work 
The work of the scientist requires knowledge 
that is acquired only through practice and pre-
cept and which therefore is not scientific in 
character. Earlier traditions in the philosophy 
of science, being mainly concerned with the 
epistemological problem of truth, have ignored 
the craft aspects of scientific knowledge. Yet, 
without an appreciation of these aspects "there 
is no possibility of resolving the paradox of the 
radical difference between the subjective, inten-
sely personal activity of creative science, and 
the objective, impersonal knowledge which 
results from it" [ 15, p. 75]. 
Craft knowledge is a repertoire of proce-
dures and judgments that are partly personal, 
partly social. Thus, when a scientist 
decides whether a batch of data is of acceptable 
quality, he applies standards that derive from 
his own experience, but also reflect the profes-
sional norms of his teachers and colleagues, as 
well as culturally determined criteria of ade-
quacy. Personal and social judgments are also 
involved in data manipulation, in the choice of 
tools and models, in the selection of evidence, 
and in the construction of an argument. 
The importance of craft knowledge and ex-
perience is even greater in policy analysis. 
Because the conclusions of a policy study can-
not be proved in the sense in which a theorem 
is proved, or even in the manner of the pro-
positions of natural science, they must satisfy 
generally accepted criteria of adequacy. Such 
criteria are derived not from abstract logical 
canons but from craft experience, depending as 
they do on the special features of the problem, 
on the quality of data and limitations of avail-
able tools, on the time constraints imposed on 
the analysts, and on the requirements of the 
client. 
Craft knowledge-less explicit than forma-
lized theoretical knowledge, but more objective 
than pure intuition-is essential in any kind of 
professional work. Aristotle's analysis of tradi-
tional craft work (in terms of the four constitu-
ents or 'causes' of the task: material, efficient, 
formal and final) has been applied by Ravetz to 
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the task of scientific inquiry. He identifies the 
material constituent with the intellectually con-
structed things and events in whose terms the 
problem is formulated. The researcher, with his 
tools and methods, is the efficient constituent 
of the task. The formal constituent is the argu-
ment that supports the conclusion of the 
inquiry, the latter corresponding to the Aristo-
telian 'final cause'. 
The same scheme can be applied to the work 
of the policy analyst. The material component 
of the analyst's task is represented by the data, 
information and other conceptual inputs used 
in formulating a problem. The technical tools 
and methods of analysis represent the efficient 
component, while the formal component is an 
argument in which evidence is cited and from 
which a conclusion is drawn. The 'final cause' 
is the conclusion itself, together with the 
related activities of communication and imple-
mentation. 
This way of describing the fine structure of 
the analyst's task enjoys one considerable 
advantage over the more conventional deci-
sion-making paradigm. The categories sug-
gested by this paradigm (goals, alternatives, 
constraints, and so on) focus attention on a 
rather narrow and specialized use of analysis as 
an applied 'logic of choice'. The craft analogy, 
on the other hand, suggests categories (data, 
information, tools, evidence, argument, conclu-
sion) that are applicable to any type and style 
of analysis, and can be shown to be particularly 
useful for assessing the technical adequacy of 
analytic work [ 13]. 
Problem solving on artificial objects 
For all its usefulness. the craft analogy con-
ceals an important difference between the work 
of the traditional artisan and that of the intel-
lectual craftsman. The artisan works with 
physical tools and materials to produce tan-
gible objects having a certain form and capable 
of performing given functions . The intellectual 
craftsman works with conceptual tools and 
inputs ; his end product is an argument leading 
to certain conclusions about the properties of 
the intellectual constructs that form the object 
of his inquiry . This leads to Ravetz's character-
ization of scientific inquiry as problem solving 
on artificial objects. The objects of scientific 
knowledge are not directly apprehended 
natural phenomena. as asserted by an influen-
tial tradition going back to Bacon and Galileo, 
but classes of intellectually constructed things 
and events : elementary particle, force, field, 
chemical element, and also the phyla and 
genera of 'natural' taxonomy. 
Similarly, the objects of policy analysis and 
policy arguments are not directly perceived 
social events, but theory-laden constructs 
resulting from definition, convention, and 
abstraction. Terms like 'price', 'cost', 'inflation', 
'GNP', 'standard of living', 'intelligence', 
'crime', are used so often that we tend to forget 
their abstract and conventional nature. Even 
the most basic social and economic statistics-
for instance, the unemployment and balance-
of-payment data that make headlines and are 
discussed at length on radio and television-
are extremely abstract things. In no way do 
they resemble "the measurements which arise 
from a direct apprehension of something, as 
when we measure a length. One cannot, even 
with good eyesight, go out onto the Treasury 
steps and observe the domestic level of econo-
mic activity" [ 4, p. 823]. 
The abstract character of the language of 
policy and of policy analysis can evoke two 
different, but equally mistaken, reactions. On 
the one hand, there is the ever-present tend-
ency to mistake for concrete things what are in 
fact theories and abstractions-Whitehead's 
fallacy of misplaced concreteness. On the other 
hand, one finds the equally widespread sus-
picion of a general conspiracy of politicians. 
bureaucrats, managers, and experts to prevent 
citizens from seeing the true essence of social 
problems by some kind of verbal magic. But 
while sympathizing with the desire for a more 
direct and transparent official language, the 
philosopher of science cannot fail to notice the 
similarity between the necessary artificiality of 
a developed legal or administrative system and 
that of a developed science. Like the natural 
world, the social world is just too complex to 
be comprehended in terms of the concepts we 
build up in our ordinary experience [15, 
p.114]. Naturally, the more elaborate policy con-
structs are ultimately derived from common-
sense experience, but in concrete applications 
formal requirements of procedure and internal 
consistency assume greater importance than 
any desire for immediate intelligibility. 
Since analysts with a technical or scientific 
background are often impatient of legal and 
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administrative formalities, it will be instructive 
to give an actual example of the unexpected 
difficulties that may arise in the attempt to sim-
plify a formalized language. In the early days of 
the Communist regime in Poland a sustained 
effort was made to draft the laws so clearly that 
they would be intelligible to the worker and 
peasant. 
"It was soon discovered, however, that this kind of clar-
ity could be attained only at the cost of those systematic 
elements in a legal system that shape its rules into a 
coherent whole and render them capable of consistent 
application by the courts. It was discovered, in other 
words, that making the laws readily understandable to 
the citizen carried a hidden cost in that it rendered their 
application by the courts more capricious and less pre-
dictable" [8, p. 45). 
3. EVALUATION 
Traditional scientific methodologies 
The different philosophies of science can be 
viewed as alternative methodologies for eva-
luating scientific theories. In this section of the 
paper, I intend to examine some implications of 
different forms of scientific appraisals for the 
evaluation of policies. More specifically, I shall 
argue that while the approach prevailing in 
policy evaluation (particularly in the United 
States) has been severely handicapped by out-
dated philosophical premises, recent work by 
Lakatos and other philosophers of science sug-
gests a basic reformulation of the goals and 
methods of evaluation analysis. 
Following Lakatos, three traditional metho-
dologies for the evaluation of scientific theories 
may be identified: Justificationism; Dogmatic 
F alsificationism; N a'ive F alsificationism. 
Justificationism or inductivism-the doc-
trine that the only scientific propositions are 
those that either describe hard facts or are cor-
rect inductive generalizations from them-is 
logically untenable. As Hume argued more 
than two centuries ago, theories cannot be de-
rived from facts. 
Dogmatic falsificationism- science cannot 
prove, but it can disprove-must also be 
rejected since no conclusive disproof of a 
theory can ever be produced. Theories always 
involve hidden background knowledge, ceteris 
paribus conditions, and auxiliary hypotheses: it 
is not clear which part of a theory would be 
refuted by a negative result. There· are no 
crucial experiments, except with hindsight: 
"nature may shout 'no' but human ingen-
uity ... may always be able to shout louder. 
With sufficient resourcefulness and some luck 
any theory may be defended 'progressively' for 
some time, even if it is false" [11, p. 100]. 
According to na'ive falsificationism, a highly 
corroborated scientific theory refutes a Jess cor-
roborated theory which is inconsistent with it. 
But the history of science offers many examples 
of 'refuted' theories being resuscitated. This 
shows that refutation should not be confused 
with elimination. If most theories are born 
refuted, mere refutations can play no dramatic 
role in science: "if any and every failure to fit 
were grounds for theory rejection, all theories 
ought to be rejected at all times" [JO, p. 145]. 
Na'ive falsificationism uses a monotheoretical 
model of criticism; one single theory is con-
fronted by potential falsifiers supplied by auth-
oritative experimental scientists. This amounts 
to introducing an arbitrary dichotomy into the 
corpus of scientific knowledge between what is 
treated as problematic and what is regarded as 
unproblematic. But experiments, instruments, 
and observations are theory-laden, and such 
theories are often no more corroborated than 
the theory to be tested (as in the case of the 
physiological and optical theories involved in 
Galileo's reports of telescopic observations of 
Jupiter's planets [7]). 
Lakatos' methodology of research programmes 
If theories are falsified all the time, the im-
portant epistemological issue is not when an 
unrefuted theory is better than a refuted rival 
one, but when a theory is better than a rival 
one if both are known to be refuted. Moreover, 
since problems are not solved but only shifted, 
the basic unit of appraisal is not an isolated 
theory but a whole 'research programme'. A 
research programme is characterized by a hard 
core(conventially accepted and made provision-
ally irrefutable by a methodological decision 
of its adherents), a positive heuristic, which 
defines problems and outlines the construction 
of a belt of auxiliary hypotheses, and a negative 
heuristic indicating the paths of research to be 
avoided. Thus, the Cartesian research pro-
gramme (the universe is a huge clockwork with 
push as the only cause of motion) tells us to 
look behind all natural phenomena, including 
life, for mechanistic explanations, and rules out 
Newtonian action at a distance. 
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Examples of competing research pro-
grammes in the social sciences are neoclassical 
and Marxian economics. The core of neoclassi-
cal economics is the notion that the economy is 
composed of free agents who perform different 
functions but are united by the common goal 
of maximizing individual utility. The idea that 
society is divided into competing social classes 
is rejected, being considered neither correct nor 
analytically useful. On the positive side, the 
object of economics is conceived of as the 
study of rational allocation of scarce resources 
among competing uses. This study can be car-
ried out at an abstract level, regardless of 
specific historical conditions, since the goal of 
maximizing individual utility has universal 
validity. The core idea of Marxian economics, 
on the other hand, is that society is divided 
into classes pursuing different, and conflicting, 
goals. According to the negative heuristics of 
the Marxian research programme, economic 
phenomena cannot be explained in terms of 
individual behavior, and it is impossible to 
define a criterion of economic efficiency valid for 
an entire society. The positive heuristics of the 
programme direct attention to class struggle, 
exploitation, and a labor-theory of value as 
the basic categories of analysis. And because 
class struggle characterizes one particular type 
of society, an economic theory of capitalism 
can be valid only for this particular phase in 
the history of humanity. 
Rival research programmes can be evaluated 
in terms of the problem-shifts they induce. A 
problem-shift is progressive if is has greater 
explanatory and predictive power than pre-
vious formulations. A research programme is 
progressing if it generates progressive problem-
shifts, otherwise it is stagnating. Thus, the 
methodology of research programmes offers 
not only a rational reconstruction of scientific 
continuity as well as scientific change, but also 
a set of normative concepts to evaluate theor-
etical developments. 
Policy evaluation 
Evaluators of administrative programmes 
are justificationists at heart-their working hy-
pothesis is that the programme is accomplish-
ing what it set out to do-but falsificationists 
by necessity. To get on with their work they 
must assume that their measuring techniques 
are unproblematic, or at least less problematic 
than the hypotheses incorporated in the pro-
gramme they evaluate; they accept a mono-
theoretical model of criticism. Like good beha-
viorists, evaluators think of themselves as 
objective experimental scientists supplying the 
policy-maker with hard facts, the 'potential 
falsifiers' of the programme. In reality, they for-
mulate goals, assign them relative weights, 
identify actors, define system boundaries and 
choose yardsticks. Paraphrasing Lakatos, we 
can say that the target of the arrow of evalu-
ation is shaped while the arrow is already in 
the air. Evaluation does not assume a fully-
articulated policy or programme; it creates it. 
Traditionally (and quite understandably, 
given the expectations of their clients), evalua-
tors have been concerned with goal achieve-
ment. But the hope of being able to justify or 
falsify an action programme by comparing 
results with goals has been dashed by the dis-
covery of the ubiquitous phenomenon of 'little 
effect'. As Carol Weiss writes, one of the major 
obstacles to putting evaluation results to use is 
precisely their dismaying tendency to show 
that the program has had little effect [18]. For 
example, many careful evaluation studies have 
revealed that the effects of variation in school 
policies on students' performance are not sig-
nificantly different, once the students' socioeco-
nomic characteristics are held constant. Inter-
estingly, organizations do not fare better : 
"Measured against the Olympic heights of the 
goal, most organizations score the same--very 
low effectiveness. The differences among or-
ganizations are of little significance" [6, p. 258]. 
Thus policies and organizations, like scientific 
theories, seem to be 'born refuted' and evalu-
ation, as usually conceived and practiced, can 
play no crucial role in their development. 
The phenomenon of 'little effect' becomes 
less surprising once we recognize that policy 
evaluation exclusively in terms of results is 
bound to be inconclusive at best, and must be 
supplemented by a careful consideration of 
process. This raises the question of the appro-
priate unit of evaluation. If policy problems are 
never solved but only shifted (and, hopefully, 
ameliorated), the objects of evaluation cannot 
be discrete decisions or actions, but related 
sequences of decisions and actions, together 
with their behavioral, cognitive and ideological 
supports. A set of dispositions, theories, pro-
posals, decisions and acts will form a recogniz-
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able policy if they are held together by a cen-
tral core of value commitments. In such a case, 
following Hylton Boothroyd [3], we speak of 
action programmes, the policy equivalent of 
Lakatos' scientific research programmes. The 
limitations of evaluation by results now 
become clear. If a programme is not to be 
abandoned at the first signs of difficulty, the 
core must be made (temporarily) immune to 
criticism by a common decision of the partici-
pants in the policy process. The core may even-
tually be overthrown, but this will signify a 
major change in policy-a revolution in some 
sense. Debate, controversy, and corrections are 
redirected on to the decisions and administrat-
ive arrangements that form the protective belt 
of the core. The effort to adapt the particular 
institutional embodiments of the programme 
to ever-changing economic, political, and tech-
nical conditions keeps the protective belt in 
constant flux, but such changes hardly affect 
the policy core. 
The methodology of action programmes 
puts evaluation in a new perspective by 
explaining the apparent paradox of the surpris-
ing stability and continuous flux that character-
ize the life cycle of all major policies. The pres-
criptions of policy evaluators often appear irre-
levant because they are directed at the wrong 
target. This point is well illustrated by the com-
ments of Mark Blaug on some recurring criti-
cicms of the British National Health Service. 
Blaug writes: 
"Whether we like it or not, the British National Health 
Service effectively replaced individual choice in the dis-
tribution of health services by collective choice. Thus, 
arguments about 'market failure' in justifying either 
government ownership or government finance are totally 
irrelevant in Britain, unless of course the thesis is that 
they ought to be made relevant by returning health to 
the market mechanism. It would seem that there is now 
a consensus among all segments of British society and 
among all shades of public opinion that health should be 
distributed in accordance with need rather than ability 
to pay, in other words, 'communism in health'" [2, 
p. 324]. 
Neither Blaug nor any other competent ana-
lyst would deny that there are serious problems 
of allocation. But as long as the consensus 
about the use of collective-choice mechanisms 
survives, solutions have to be found at the level 
of specific administrative measures (e.g. by 
selective charges within the National Health 
Services), without compromising the integrity 
of the policy core. 
OME 8/2-C 
4. POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
Policies versus decisions 
In order to understand policy development it 
is necessary to draw a distinction between poli-
cies and decisions. A decision, in the sense of 
decision theory, is a choice or judgment made 
on the basis of available data among well-
defined courses of action whose consequences 
under alternative 'states of the world' are 
reasonably well understood. The decision-
theoretic paradigm does not recognize any 
essential difference between decision and 
action : if the decision does not lead to the cor-
responding act, it was because something 
occurred to prevent it, and a new decision 
problem arises. Nor does it differentiate 
between policies and decisions; policies are 
simply bigger, high-level decisions, or perhaps, 
sequences of such decisions. Consequently, 
good policy-making, rational decision-making, 
scientific problem-solving are, in this view, 
largely synonymous expfessions. The same 
analytic categories are used indifferently as an 
idealized description of good policy-making or 
as prescriptions for conducting policy analysis. 
Now, public and private managers must 
often make choices in situations which closely 
approximate the decision-theory model: where 
to build a school or a hospital; which curricu-
lum to adopt for the next school year; whether 
to expand an existing plant or build a new one. 
But policies do not live by decisions alone. The 
basic constituents of policies viewed as action 
programmes-dispositions to act, core com-
mitments, theories, plans and their institutional 
embodiments- remain largely outside the pure 
logic of choice. In taking a decision, one simply 
tries to do one's best in the present circum-
stances, to choose wisely among the available 
gambles. Policies are characterized by a certain 
deliberate quality, a relative permanence, and 
the possibility of further development ; they 
tend to become doctrines, directing future 
action and giving coherence to past actions. 
This gives policies an objective character which 
decisions do not possess. 
The decision-maker of decision theory, like 
the consumer of economic theory, is the sole 
judge and executor of his own choices. But 
even in the most tightly centralized organiza-
tion, few decisions are made and carried out by 
only one person. Hence the problem of com-
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municating and legitimizing decisions in inter-
subjective terms. Subjective choices must be 
related to a plan. a doctrine. a strategic view-
point. in other words, to an articulate action 
programme. It should be noticed that, while 
such post-decision developments are irrelevant 
to the logic of choice, they are an essential ele-
ment of organizational policy-making. 
As long as policies are identified with deci-
sions, development can only be interpreted as 
decisionmakers changing their minds. This is a 
rather simplistic view of policy and does not 
explain many important events (such as the 
emergence of unanticipated consequences, and 
various forms of interaction and feedback in 
the policy space) that are neither planned nor 
intended. 
The policy space 
Lakatos and the later Popper concentrate on 
the growth and development of theories rather 
than on their refutation. Theories develop and 
grow in a quasi-autonomous space of objective 
intellectual constructs, of thoughts-in-them-
selves. Popper distinguishes three 'worlds' or 
levels of reality: first , the world of physical 
objects and physical states; second, the world 
of mental states, of subjective preferences and 
beliefs; and third, a world of objective struc-
tures that are produced by human minds but 
which. once produced, exist independently of 
them (theories. artistic creations and styles, 
norms, institutions, problem situations, critical 
arguments). This 'World 3' is autonomous from 
the other two levels of reality. though it is 
related to them by a number of links and feed-
backs. Developments in World 3 occur largely 
as the result of unanticipated consequences of 
previous theories. and of the problem situ-
ations they generate. Lakatos' methodology of 
research programmes represents a fine-struc-
ture explanation of the process of theory devel-
opment, and adds normative criteria to dis-
tinguish between positive and negative devel-
opments. 
I will now introduce the notion of a policy 
space consisting of (actual and potential) policy 
problems, policy arguments, norms, con-
straints. tentative solutions and their insti-
tutional embodiments. The policy space is a 
subset of Popper's World 3 and, as such, it is 
largely autonomous though still interacting 
with the psychological second world of subjec-
tive preferences, beliefs, goals. and decisions. In 
fact, some of the most interesting phenomena 
appearing in the policy space arise as the 
unplanned consequences of men's decisions. 
They are, in Hume's words. the results of 
human action but not of human design (think 
of phenomena like traffic congestion, pollution, 
or inflation). Historian AJ P Taylor expresses 
tersely the objective character of the policy 
space when he writes that statesmen take one 
step, and the next follows from it. 
In policy-space terms. policy development is 
a sequence of partly overlapping action pro-
grammes. The focus of the analysis is not on 
individuals and groups as change agents. but 
on objective features like policy content, evolv-
ing doctrines and problem situations, changing 
constraints, and interactions among different 
policies. Ideally, one attempts to explain policy 
development by showing how some overall 
pattern, which one would have thought had to 
be produced by an individual's or group's suc-
cessful attempt to realize the pattern, instead 
was generated and maintained by a process 
that in no way had the overall pattern 'in mind' 
[14]. Perhaps this approach is not as intuit-
ively appealing as a 'second world' approach 
which, by focusing attention on the actors and 
the moves leading to specific decisions. seems 
to offer a more direct causal explanation of the 
dynamics of policy change. But numerous case 
studies provide evidence that the influence of 
particular decision makers and special interest 
groups on actual (as opposed to anticipated) 
developments is often over-estimated. At any 
rate, policy-space explanations have the meth-
odological advantage of minimizing the use of 
notions constituting the phenomena to be 
explained ; they do not explain complicated 
patterns by including the end-result as the 
object of people's preferences or beliefs. 
As was mentioned above, Lakatos proposes 
some normative criteria for evaluating the de-
velopment of research programmes: a research 
programme is progressing as long as it keeps 
predicting novel facts with some success; it is 
stagnating if it gives only post-hoc explana-
tions either of chance discoveries or of facts 
anticipated by a rival programme. It is, how-
ever, very difficult to decide when a research 
programme has degenerated hopelessly, or 
when one of two rival programmes has 
achieved a decisive advantage over the other; 
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one must not demand progress at each single 
step. 
Criteria for evaluating policy development 
are even more difficult to discover and to 
apply. Here I can only suggest some possible 
adaptations of Lakatos' criteria. First, an 
action programme may be said to be progress-
ing as long as it succeeds in disposing of issues, 
i.e. in moving them from the stage of conten-
tion to a class of issues which the actors in the 
policy process judge to be in a state of satisfac-
tory, if temporary, resolution. In comparing 
two action programmes, A and B, A is pro-
gressing if it succeeds in solving or ameliorat-
ing problems which proved intractable for B 
(the comparison between the Keynesian pro-
grammes of the New Deal and the laissez-faire 
approach of President Hoover comes to mind). 
Such criteria of progress may be further refined 
by distinguishing programme shifts that rep-
resent faithful developments of the policy core 
from those that do not. For example, since the 
core principle of a national health service is 
that health care should be distributed accord-
ing to 'need', a . return to the principle of 
ability-to-pay (e.g. through generalized user 
charges) would be a regressive move by this cri-
terion, whatever its merits in terms of alloca-
tive efficiency. One could, of course, argue that 
an apparently regressive move (such as Lenin's 
New Economic Policy) may in fact be the best 
strategy for blocking serious threats to the in-
tegrity of the policy core, for gaining time, and 
for attracting new support. But this only 
proves Lakatos' point that, whatever criterion 
one adopts, one must not demand progress at 
each single step. Nor should we forget the role 
that persuasion can play in modifying the stan-
dards by which progress is assessed. 
5. PERSUASION 
Scientific advocacy 
New ideas are even harder to sell than new 
products. Time is needed until favorable evi-
dence accumulates and auxiliary ideas come to 
the rescue. The very criteria of evaluation have 
been patterned after the prevailing conceptions, 
and moulded by existing institutions; and what 
is counted as relevant evidence is determined 
by methodological rules distilled from past 
practice. Because established scientific · para-
digms tend to become parochial in their range 
of interests and intolerant of inconsistencies, 
ideas in agreement with accepted doctrines 
enjoy a considerable comparative advantage 
over unconventional proposals. 
The Copernican heliocentric theory is prob-
ably the best-known example of an epoch-mak-
ing idea gaining recognition only gradually and 
indirectly. Significant supporting evidence (stel-
lar parallax and effect on falling bodies of the 
earth's rotation) could not be produced until 
about 300 years after the first announcement of 
the theory. According to Ravetz, "up to the 
early seventeenth century, a judicious astro-
nomer who had no metaphysical bias in his 
assessment would return the opinion 'not pro-
ven' on the Copernican system, and treat it as 
an hypothesis" [15, p. 127]. 
Alexandre Koyre, and other historians of 
science after him, have likened to propaganda 
the work of Galileo in support of the Coperni-
can hypothesis. 
"But propaganda of this kind is not a marginal affair 
that may or may not be added to allegedly more sub-
stantial means of defence, and that should perhaps be 
avoided by the 'professionally honest scientist'. In the 
circumstances we are considering now, propaganda is of 
the essence. It is of the essence because interest must be 
created at a time when the usual methodological pres-
criptions have no point of attack ; and because this inter-
est must be maintained, perhaps for centuries, until new 
reasons arrive" [7, p. 52). 
As one would expect, the role of persuasion is 
even more significant in the social sciences. 
Thus, in discussing Adam Smith's principlr.s of 
division of labor and free exchange, the authors 
of a well-known textbook write:· "It is interest-
ing that Smith's book did not contain a logi-
cally correct exposition; instead it contained a 
masterfully persuasive statement of the results 
of free exchange. It was Robert Torreus, who 
some forty years after the idea had been 'sold', 
demonstrated its logical validity. Possibly, had 
Smith tried to give a logically air-tight demon-
stration, instead of suggestive plausible inter-
pretation, he would never have made his 'point' 
popular" [ 1, p. 211]. George Stigler adds 
Jevons and Bohm-Bawerk to the list of out-
standing economists who "have employed the 
techniques of the huckster". According to 
Stigler, techniques of persuasion "have pre-
ceded and accompanied the adoption on a 
large scale of almost every new idea in econo-
mic theory" [16, p. 5]. 
If persuasion plays such an important func-
tion in the development of scientific ideas, can 
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policy analysts afford to slight it in the name of 
an historically mistaken view of scientific 
method? The moral of our examples is clear : 
the question is not whether analysts should use 
persuasion in proposing new policy ideas, but 
which forms of persuasion may be used effec-
tively and without violating basic principles of 
professional ethics. 
Legitimate uses of persuasion 
Analysts attempt to influence policy by 
modifying the attitudes of policy-makers. When 
they produce relevant information, check for 
feasibility, develop models, and compare pro-
fits and costs, they seek to change attitudes 
through cognitive means. But since attitudes 
do not depend exclusively on rational factors, 
cognitive means must often be reinforced by 
noncognitive modes of persuasion. Thus, style, 
elegance of expression, tension of plot and nar-
rative may be needed to strengthen the effect of 
descriptive statements which, by themselves, 
would be incapable of altering prevailing atti-
tudes. Indeed, in our culture maximum effec-
tiveness in communication is achieved neither 
by purely rational, nor by purely persuasive 
means, but by a subtle blend of these two 
means of redirecting attitudes. 
Philosophers like Charles L. Stevenson have 
called attention to the phenomenon of 'persua-
sive definitions'. Even specialized languages 
contain many terms that have both a descrip-
tive meaning (sometimes made precise by a 
technical definition), and an emotive (laudatory 
or derogatory) meaning. The purport of a per-
suasive definition is to alter the descriptive 
meaning of a term by giving it greater analyti-
cal precision; but the definition does not make 
any substantial change in the term's emotive 
meaning. In the context of policy analysis, one 
needs only to think of terms like efficiency, 
optimality, rationality, scientific method, risk, 
pollution, and needs (as in 'medical needs' ). 
The emotive meaning of such expressions can-
not be obliterated by any technical definition, 
however precise. What is even more important, 
the definition is actually used, often uncons-
ciously, in an effort to modify attitudes by the 
interplay of emotive and descriptive meanings. 
Even the term 'analysis' profits from the lauda-
tory connotation derived from triumphs of the 
analytic method in mechanics. Thus, we con-
tinue to speak of systems or policy analysis, 
though most people agree that synthesis and 
design are actually more important. 
Since persuasion is such a pervasive linguistic 
phenomenon, the practical question is not 
whether to reject it, but which forms of per-
suasion to reject. The history of science can 
help us in identifying situations in which per-
suasion can be used legitimately in support of, 
but not in place of, rational analysis. Consider 
first a situation in which the psychological 
effect of purely rational arguments is not 
strong enough to overcome the inertia of long-
established patterns of thinking-even after the 
need for a change has become clear. For 
example, it is unlikely that Copernicans could 
have survived the long march through the 
social and scientific institutions of their time 
had they accepted battle on the grounds cho-
sen by their adversaries (mostly entrenched in 
the universities). Their propagandist appeals to 
"a new secular class with a new outlook and 
considerable contempt for the science of the 
schools, for its methods, its results, even for its 
language" [7, p. 182] appear justifiable in this 
context. 
Again, the impact of rational arguments on 
human minds may operate too slowly to bring 
about timely decisions. For instance, it is 
doubtful that sorely needed energy policies, 
requiring profound changes in values and atti-
tudes, can be made acceptable by purely tech-
nical arguments. Not surprisingly, some recent 
proposals (such as Amory B Lovins' soft 
energy paths) owe their strong popular impact 
to an extremely sophisticated use of persuasive 
techniques- backed by some hard analysis. 
As a third example, consider the case in 
which the persuasive support of a new idea is 
in advance of the rational support. It may be 
that full evidence is hard to obtain (as in Gali-
leo's case) ; or that the technical tools for an 
adequate treatment of the problem do not 
exist; and it may be that experts disagree and 
science gives only ambiguous answers, as in 
many controversies over nuclear safety. In such 
cases, persuasive arguments (bolstered by 
whatever empirical and theoretical knowledge 
is available), may succeed in stimulating inter-
est in the issue and keeping it alive until more 
adequate methods of analysis have been devel-
oped. More generally, since policy analysis 
cannot produce logically binding proofs but 
only more or less reasonable arguments, it is 
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clear that persuasion can always play a signifi-
cant role in increasing the credibility of the 
conclusions. 
One particular form of persuasion is 'ratio-
nalization', which psychologists define as the 
attempt to explain a posteriori one's actions by 
means of rational motives rather than by the 
'real' (unconscious) motives. One of the recur-
rent criticisms of policy analysis is that it pro-
vides 'pseudoscientific rationalizations' for 
politically or bureaucratically determined pos-
itions. Thus, former US Secretary of Defense, 
McNamara, has been criticized for using cost-
effectiveness studies as ammunition against 
congressmen who opposed antiballistic missiles 
(ABM), even though his own opposition to 
ABM was based on other factors. Whether or 
not this particular allegation is true, it is im-
portant to understand that it is not necessarily 
dishonest to use justificatory arguments based 
on considerations different from those that lead 
us to the adoption of a given policy position. 
Policy arguments are always directed to par-
ticular audiences, and there is nothing intrinsi-
cally reprehensible in selecting the combination 
of facts, values, and analytic methods which 
seems to be most appropriate for a given 
audience. Indeed, there is no unique way to 
construct an argument: data and evidence can 
be selected in many ways from the available 
information, and there are several alternative 
methods for analysis and ways of ordering 
values. A policy, like a theory [9], is a cluster 
of conclusions in search of a premise; not the 
least important task of analysis is discovering 
the premises that make a set of conclusions 
internally consistent, and convincing to the 
widest possible audience. 
In this paper I have discussed a number of 
methodological issues suggested to the student 
of decision- and policy-making by the recent 
literature on the history and philosophy of 
science. Some interesting analogies between the 
policy process and its cognitive supports on 
the one side, and the process of scientific 
inquiry, on the other, have emerged. Of course, 
it is not so much the analogies that are impor-
tant (however striking and heuristically useful 
they may be), as the methodological 
approaches they suggest. While these remain 
still largely untested, it seems possible to assert 
that the ideas discussed here clearly point in 
the direction of professional attitudes and intel-
lectual orientations that differ significantly 
from those associated with older views of scien-
tific method. 
One question that has not been explicitly 
discussed is, how scientific is policy analysis? 
For, as Professor Eilon has pointed out, one 
cannot debate such a question in the abstract, 
but only with reference to a particular concep-
tion of science [5]. With respect to Popperian 
hypothetico-deductive methodology, Eilon 
concluded that operational research is a scien-
tific activity, but not in every respect. An ana-
logous conclusion may be stated for policy 
analysis. In this paper I have stressed the simi-
larities with the process of scientific inquiry, 
but the differences are also important and per-
haps deserve a separate investigation. 
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